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5 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2-
2(3)(j), review of a final judgment 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
L The Trial Court erred in ruling that Appellant Johnson released 
Appellee Gym for injuries in its parking lot when she signed the 
membership agreement. 
Whether the exculpatory clause in the membership agreement 
with Golds Gym waives Appellant Johnson's negligence action for 
injuries suffered in the parking lot. The clause should be strictly 
construed against the gym because it is ambiguous, the parking lot is 
not conspicuously mentioned, and it is against public policy. 
II. Appellant Johnson's claim of injury from an unsafe condition on 
property does not arise from a temporary condition on property and 
she does not have to prove that Appellees had notice and a 
reasonable time to fix the unsafe condition as a precondition to 
Appellees' liability. 
Whether the injury from the unsafe parking lot arose from an unsafe 
condition of a permanent nature. The gym has an ongoing duty to its 
business invitee to inspect, maintain and repair the parking lot. It also owes 
a duty to the public who uses the same parking lot. The defects are open, 
obvious and apparent to the Appellees. The parking lot would be safe if this 
ongoing duty were met. The Appelles should be responsible for the parking 
lot, which makes this a permanent condition on land. 
III. The trial court erred in finding there is no factual issue on whether 
the defendants had constructive notice of the unsafe condition of 
the parking lot. 
The facts in the record provided in the addendum, clearly show a fact 
issue that cannot be resolved on summary judgment of whether the 
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Appellees had constructive notice, or are deemed by operation of law 
because of their breaches of their duty concerning the parking lot, to have 
knowledge of the unsafe condition of the parking lot so Appellant Johnson 
does not have to show this precondition for her action if it is based on the 
temporary condition analysis. 
IV. The trial court was the improper venue to 
decide the motion for summary judgment. 
Appellant Johnson did not get to express her opposition when the case 
was transferred from the most convenient and proper forum in Provo, UT, to 
American Fork, UT, after it had been pending for 2 years in Provo. 
V. The trial court abused its discretion in striking Appellant Johnson's 
experts witnesses. 
The new trial court judge abused his discretion by denying Appellant 
Johnson's request for time to get the facts for her experts before providing 
the experts reports. The delay in getting the facts was caused by Appellees 
failure to comply with discovery obligations. 
VI. The trial court was without jurisdiction to enter an order on 
the motion to reconsider or on defendant's motion to strike 
Plaintiffs photographs and erroneously seeks to impose a rule 
barring any pre-final-judgment motions to reconsider. 
The trial court wants to promote a rule barring motions to reconsider 
pre-final judgment rulings. Appellant Johnson filed a motion to reconsider 
the memorandum decision that granted summary judgment. The trial court 
granted a final judgment 10 days later. Then, Appellant Johnson appealed 
within 30 days. Her appeal removed jurisdiction from the trial court to 
decide the motion to reconsider. But then the trial court still entered a new 
memorandum opinion 12 days after the notice of appeal was filed. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case. 
This case is an action in negligence where Plaintiff-Appellant Nelda 
P. Johnson (herein "Appellant Johnson") seeks damages for personal injuries 
suffered in a trip and fall on July 9, 2004, at 9:30 p.m., at defendant's 
parking lot. 
Appellant Johnson was injured in a trip and fall accident on unsafe 
asphalt in the parking lot at Gold's Gym in Provo, Utah. She incurred about 
$30,000 in medical expenses for a surgery required to connect the ligaments 
to her knee cap. 
Appellant Plaintiff signed a membership agreement with Gold's Gym 
on July 7, 2004. Gold's Gym is located on 900 East in Provo, UT. She 
went to the gym for her first time on July 9, 2004, with her daughter, son-in-
law, and son. She finished her workout and was leaving at about 9:30 p.m. 
When the family was leaving the gym Appellant Johnson tripped and fell on 
broken asphalt. Her knee swelled immediately and she was taken to the 
Orem Community Hospital. She had surgery to repair the knee after 
physical therapy was unable help her. She seeks compensation for her 
injuries caused by negligence. 
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Defendant-Appellee Gold's Gym (herein "Appellee Gym") leases the 
property where its gym is located from Defendant-Appellee Peay Investment 
Con ipany (1 lei eii 1"" ' , Lppellee Pea,)/ ' "")
 ( '\ ppellee Gym operates its business of 
a fitness centei h] ' charging foi adi i lissioi i ai i- :i i i lei i lbei si lip 
Course of Proceedings 
The civil action ii i negligence was filed in Provo, UT, on April 13, 
2005. The parties went through discovery, which was supposed to end on 
, . .\ \ * witnesses finally made available by 
But Appellee Peay did not file iu> OPL . - atoi ies 
and requests for production of documents until March 5, 2007. These 
answers were not timely. They were provided after coin isel called and 
IniIIiided counsel they had failed to file them. Then,, the answers, instead of 
pro\ uliiii! inluriimfiuii fii\i .usscifnl oh|c.rlioir, lo every request. In addition, 
Appellee Peay failed to ever mrT n 
during the period of fact discovery. It finally made its owner available for a 
deposition or- \Trr 11 „ 200" I .-, cr answered the discovery requests. 
The aciioii nad proceedec ^ovo. UT from April 13, 2005, to May 
15, 2007 i _• .,**.;; e had a possible conflict of 
interest and sent the n< " on 
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May 15, 2007. The parties were not consulted, asked to consent, or given 
any chance to comment on the transfer. 
Appellant Johnson filed a motion to compel answers to the discovery 
responses on May 16, 2007, now in the new court in American Fork. 
Appellees responded on May 21, 2007, and merely complained that 
appellant's counsel had not conferred with them before he filed the motion. 
In the middle of the conflict over discovery, Defendants-Appellees 
filed a motion for summary judgment on April 4, 2007. Appellant Johnson 
filed a Motion for Extension of time to respond to the motion for summary 
judgment on April 24, 2007. She explained that two of her witnesses were 
out of state and needed additional time to provide an affidavit, that she had 
only received the motion two days prior to the deadline to respond, and that 
she needed time to get expert reports. She indicated she had been delayed in 
getting expert reports because of the failure of Appellee Peay to cooperate in 
discovery. 
Defendants-Appellees filed a motion to strike plaintiffs experts on or 
about April 27, 2007. Appellant Johnson responded to this motion to strike 
her experts on May 16, 2007. The new trial judge in American Fork, UT, 
who just got the case on May 15, 2007, filed an order striking Appellant's 
experts related to the defective asphalt on July 2, 2007, and he gave 
10 
Appellant Johnson seven days to respond to the motion for summary 
judgment. 
A (»| >el Ices sought summary judgment claiming that Appellant Johnson 
was - (I : ember ship contract 1 lad 
a clause that prevented her from siiin^i (or aii \ ii'iuii.* ll..il * e< .' 'lie 
premises. Appellees also claimed the injuries arose from defective asphalt 
in the parking lot, which is a temporary condition so Appellant Johnson must 
show the Appellees had notice of the defective asphalt before the fall and 
pu- «. .; p.!,a:ii Johnson n *p .«i.u iall. Appellees 
argued A nrv ' . , issues so 
summary judgment should be granted. 
r Disposition of Trial Court 
The American Fork trial judge granted summary judgment in a 
memorandum decision on September 1 7, 200 7 I he trial court ruled that the 
Appellees are not LilT IH/I auv /\p|M,JLei( Juliiisuii signed a release 
provision in her membership contract * : -* 
liability for injuries suffered in the parking lot. It also ruled that Appellees 
are not negligent as a matter of law because the parking lot defect was 
•'ornry in nature and Plaintiff failed to show actual or constructive notice 
'•• •^'V'lii;.-; c parking lot pn<;; io :iie trip .uui 'all accident; 
i 
and failed to show that Appellees had sufficient time to cure the temporary 
premises defect and failed to do so. 
Appellant Johnson filed a motion to reconsider the memorandum 
decision granting summary judgment on October 10, 2007. The trial court 
filed its order and judgment granting summary judgment on October 18, 
2007. The trial court did not rule on the motion to reconsider before the 
appeal deadline was reached so Appellant Johnson filed her notice of appeal 
on November 17, 2007. 
The trial court, on November 29, 2007, 12 days after the notice of 
appeal was filed, denied Appellant Johnson's motion to reconsider the ruling 
on summary judgment, denied her motion compel discovery against 
Appellee Peay because it ruled it was moot, and granted Appellees motion to 
strike photographs that were submitted with the motion to reconsider. 
The motion to reconsider also raised the issue that venue was 
improper in American Fork. The trial court said this issue was waived 
because it was not raised earlier. 
The trial court also refused to let Appellant Johnson use any expert 
witnesses to address the defect in the parking lot asphalt. 
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RELEVANT FACTS 
The trial court, stated two facts are not in dispute, which are in dispute. 
1 . ; acts are: 
Fact No. /, Prior to being informed by plaintiff of her 
injury and the defect in the parking lot that caused it, defendants 
had never observed or been made aware of any dangerous 
condition, either cracks or holes, existing within the asphalt 
parking lot. 
^ ic- N< * " Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that 
defendants hau noiice of any dangerous condition existing in 
the parking lot prior io plaintiffs fall. 
Motrin I Ve i t 
In addition, then, i .1 I i« I J <li 1 id m Jul I HI I lie exculpatory 
clause in the membership contract with / r 
These two alleged uncontroverted facts from the Uiai cuuii 
• \vnw because of constructive notice and whether the unsafe 
property should be evaluated as a permanent 
condit i . . • c ixnn^e in 
the membership contract is relevam in whether thr rnnii:in JK 101 in 
strictly construed against Appellee Gym. 
The relevant facts in the record show these factual issues. The 
fo] - ig references are to the attachments to the Plaintiffs memorandum in 
in,,, !IT \lc\ niiMcteialioti ofOrdei Granting Summary 
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Judgment, filed Oct. 10, 2007, and included in the addendum. These fact 
disputes include the following: 
1. Plaintiff, in her response to the motion for summary 
judgment, page 6, specifically denied the alleged facts 
stated by defendant. She said, "[a]lleged fact nos. 11-12 
are false." Then she explained that Appellees alleged 
that they never observed or were made aware of the 
unsafe condition of the parking lot. Appellant Johnson 
disputed this clain and stated Appellees neglected to take 
care of the parking lot. 
2. Troy Petersen has been the Chief Financial Officer for 
Gold's Gym for 11 years, an Owner of 10% of the stock 
in 15 gyms, and in charge of maintenance. T. Petersen 
Depo., dated 2/1/07, At 3,4,6,7, attached as Exhibit 2. 
3. He accepts that Appellee Gym has the responsibility of 
maintaining and keeping in good repair the parking lot. 
Id. At 19. 
4. Mr. Petersen has never seen a crack that may pose a 
danger to patrons. T. Petersen Depo., At 15. 
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Mr. Petersen was given Plaintiffs letter on October 12, 
2004, describing her injury and complaining of the 
bi okei 1 asp! lalt I I 'etersen depo. At 8; Ex. 1. I le never . 
responded In Ihr kiln n r \ n in\ estimated In >,u \ line .' 
she was injured, nor had anyone else investigate I :i - t 
0, ]<nM ! 
The or\W repairs were done in 1997, and then September 
^eterson Depo. ;-H, 16. Mr. Petersen 
Oi day c U l l U i l K '• ,1 f 
12-14. They only had paid $1,000 for the entire parking 
lot repair, Ex. 2. 
Plaintiff investigated this claim of repair to the parking 
person who reportedly 
repaired the pawn in 11 mil1 in I illni \ iinnir ii'ieatei .H iin 
house of Mr. Petersen and did not repair the pavement 
Memo. Reconsider, Exhibit 1, para. 9-10. 
N li Petersen hired a maintenance director. Nate Loftin 
Depn,. daled Febr. 1, lull " I o, /. attached as Exhibit 3. 
1'hi' inaintenaiKo dir^'Mor direr!s 10 v:v oi ker s I oftii i 
Depo. At 13. He has never requested any of the ten 
employees to maintain the parking lot._kl. at 15. His 
specific duties include maintaining the equipment and 
building, which takes 95% of his time. Id. at 14-15, 7. 
His duties do not include maintaining the parking lot. Id. 
He has never been given any instructions about how to 
maintain the parking lot. Id. At 7. He never has 
inspected the parking lot where Plaintiff was injured. Id. 
There is nobody else is in charge of the parking lot 
maintenance. Id. 7-8. He has been in charge of 
maintenance for Gold's Gym since July 1999. Id. At 6, 
But he never knew of Plaintiff s incident in the parking 
lot until January 2007. Id. At 16-17. 
Even the President of the company did not know it had a 
duty to maintain the parking lot. L. Felsted Depo., dated 
2/1/2007, at 9-12, attached as Exhibit 4. She has never 
controlled maintenance of the property nor has she ever 
directed a maintenance program, Id. But she recognizes 
that if an injury were reported, she would want it 
investigated and reported to her immediately. Id At 18. 
10- Appellee Peay has owned the property since 1958. It 
leased it in 1995 to Gold's Gym. A large portion of the 
parking lot was repaved in 2003-2004. Deposition of 
Lynn Tregeagle, dated May 11, 2007 (herein "T. Depo") 
at 9, 48-52, attached as Exhibit 6. The Property Owner is 
an architect, has built ten houses, and owned a floor 
covering store for 25 years. T. Depo. At 8,9,11. The 
Property Owner denies any responsibility to make the 
property safe for business invitees. T. Depo. At 37. It 
has no policy for inspecting the property. T. Depo. At 
38. It is not aware of any maintenance done to the 
property since 1995. T. Depo. At 33, 27. The property 
owner left all responsibility to care for the parking lot to 
Appellee Gym. T. Depo. At 16. 
11. Exhibit 1 Attached to Appellant Johnson's declaration, 
has three maps attached to it as pages 7-9. The maps 
show a portion of the parking lot that was paved by 2004. 
Mr. Tregeagle testified this work was done in 2003 or 
2004. T. Depo., 49-52. The earliest map from 2000 
shows that a building was sitting on the parking lot in 
17 
2000. No person has yet provided the name of who did 
this pavement. Their stonewalling has totally prevented 
discovery on the condition of the pavement. 
12. The photographs attached as Exhibit 1 show the unsafe, 
defective condition of the parking lot. The first pictures, 
pages 1-2, show the site about the time of Plaintiff s 
accident. Then, the pictures on pages 3-4 show the same 
cracks were still there in March 2005, eight months after 
the accident. Finally, recent pictures from 2007, pages 5-
6, show the repair to the small section of the asphalt by 
2007, but show that there are still serious potholes. 
13. Pictures on pages 7, 8 and 9, show aerial overflights of 
the property in 2000, 2004 and 2006. Mr. Treageagle 
testified of how a building was taken from the property in 
2003 or 4, and pavement covered the whole where the 
building was taken. T. Depo. at 49-52. 
14. Mr. Peterson believes that cracks do not pose dangers to 
patrons but only repairs them for aesthetic fixes. T. 
Petersen dep. At 16. He has never seen a crack in a 
parking lot that he thinks poses a danger to a patron. Id. 
18 
at 15. Mr. Petersen never commented on the condition of 
the parking lot to anyone. He has never made any report 
about the condition of the parking lot. He only walked 
occasionally through the parking lot to look at its 
condition. Id. at 16. 
15. A trip hazard exists if pavement has Vi to 3A inch ledge. 
T. Depo., At 55-56. 
16. The maintenance director has repaired one pothole at 
another location in West Jordan. He did it because it was 
reported by a patron. It was only 3A inches deep, and 18 
inches in diameter. But he believed it needed to be 
repaired so it would not injure somebody. They 
barricaded the pothole until it was repaired. Loftin Depo., 
pages 9-11. 
17. The maintenance director has never been trained to 
maintain the parking lots. Loftin Depo. At 12-13., 18. 
18. The manger Kandi Negrete, has never been trained in 
doing property maintenance. K. Negrete Depo. date 
Febr. 1, 2007, At 29, attached as Exhibit 5. She has not 
19 
done or managed any property maintenance. Negrete 
Depo. At 8. 
19. The RELEASE/EXCULPATORY CLAUSE is 
ambiguous on whether it releases liability for negligence 
in maintaining the parking lot. Mr. Petersen is familiar 
with the contract. He has no opinion whether the 
assumption of the risk clause relate to injuries in the 
parking lot. T. Petersen Depo. At 22. 
20. The sales manager admitted that she do not explain the 
contract. Negrete Depo. AT 10. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
First, the trial court was incorrect in finding that Appellant Johnson's 
action in negligence was barred by the release in the membership contract. 
The exculpatory clause in the membership contract should be strictly 
construed against Appellee Gym because it wrote it, it is ambiguous, the 
release of liability for injuries in the parking lot is not conspicuously stated, 
and it is against public policy. 
Second, the trial court erred as a matter of law and fact in finding that 
the broken pavement in the parking lot was an unsafe condition of a 
temporary nature that required proof of notice to the defendants and time to 
cure the defect. Appellees have a permanent duty owed to their business 
invitees to inspect and maintain the parking lot. They failed to meet this 
obligation. The condition was obvious and apparent. The unsafe condition 
would not exist on the property if Appelles met their permanent duty. 
Therefore, the unsafe condition must be analyzed as one of a permanent 
nature. 
Third, the trial court erred in finding there is no fact issue of 
constructive notice concerning the defective condition of the parking lot. 
This case was decided on summary judgment. The facts and inferences must 
be viewed in the light favorable to Appellant Johnson. The facts infer that 
21 
Appellees did not inspect the parking lot, had no maintenance program for it, 
and did not provide truthful information about the repairs done to the 
parking lot. These facts require that Appellees be deemed to have 
constructive knowledge of the unsafe conditions on the property that caused 
injuries to Appellant Johnson. 
Fourth, the trial court that decided the motion for summary judgment 
was the improper venue for this cause of action. The case had been pending 
for two years in Provo. Then, six weeks after summary judgment was filed, 
the Provo court sent the action to a new judge in American Fork. This 
transfer of the case was in violation of state law. Appellant Johnson was not 
advised, consulted, given a chance to consent or object to this change. The 
matter should be sent back to Provo. 
Fifth, the trial court abused its discretion in striking Appellant 
Johnson's expert witnesses. The delay in getting reports from the experts 
was caused in large part by the failure to provide fact discovery by Appellee 
Peay. Plaintiff should have been allowed time to get the fact discovery, then 
to provide the expert's reports before summary judgment was entered. 
Sixth and finally, the trial court ruling of November 29, 2007, should 
be stricken. It was filed 12 days after the notice of appeal was entered in this 
matter. It lacked jurisdiction to enter the order. 
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DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
This negligence action was dismissed on summary judgment. When 
this Court reviews an order granting summary judgment, which presents a 
question of law, its employs a correctness standard and views the facts and 
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party. Matheson v. Marbec Investments, LLC, 173 P.3d 199 
(UT App. 2007); Dowling v. Bullen, 2004 UT 50, 94 P.3d 915. 
Furthermore, summary judgment should rarely be granted in negligence 
actions because they require drawing inferences from the facts, which is 
properly done by juries rather than judges. Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 
P.2d 568, 571 (UT 1996) (quoting Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d 
182, 183 (UT 1991)). 
I. The Trial Court erred in ruling that Appellant Johnson released 
Appellee Gym for injuries in its parking lot when she signed the 
membership agreement. 
The trial court ignored precedent and advanced its own agenda of 
eliminating the strict construction rule against exculpatory clauses and held 
it barred Appellant Johnson's negligence action against Appellee Gym for 
injuries she suffered in its parking lot. Utah courts strictly construe contract 
clauses that attempt to limit one's liability unless the preclusion against 
negligence is clearly and unequivocally stated. Walker Bank & Trust v. 
23 
First Security Corp., 341 P.2d 944 (UT 1959). 
The courts look with disfavor on attempts to avoid liability and 
construe exculpatory clauses strictly against the entity relying on them, 
especially when it prepared the document. American Automobile Insurance 
Co. v. Seaboard Surety, 155 Cal.App.2d 192, 318 P.2d 84 (1958); Talley v. 
Skelly Oil Co., 199 Kan. 767, 433 P.2d 425 (1967); Walker Bank & Trust 
Co. v. First Security Corp., 341 P.2wd 944 (1959). Clauses which exclude 
liability must speak clearly and directly to the particular conduct of the 
defendant which caused the harm at issue. Anderson & Nafziger v. GT 
Newcomb, Inc., 595 P.2d 209 (ID 1979); Valley National Bank v. Tang, 18 
Ariz.App. 40, 499 P.2d 991 (1972). 
The trial court must look at the purpose of the entire agreement, its 
context, and its subject, together with the facts and surrounding 
circumstances to see if there is a clear and unequivocal expression of the 
parties intent. Russ v. Woodside Homes, Inc., 905 P.2d 901, 905 
(Ut.App.1995). Exculpatory agreements are not binding if they do not 
clearly and unequivocally express the parties' agreement to absolve a 
defendant of liability. Ghionis v. Deer Valley Resort Co., 839 F.Supp. 789 
(UT 1993). An overbroad exculpatory clause in a waiver form is 
unenforceable. Atkins v. Swimwest Family Fitness Center, 691 NW.2d 334, 
24 
338, 340 (Wisc.2005). But the trial court erroneously sought to "limit the 
application of this strict construction rule" and refused to apply it against 
Appellee Gym. Memo. Dec. at 4 of 11. 
Appellee Gym wrote the exculpatory clause in its contract. The 
language should be strictly construed against it. The signature was obtained 
by a salesman who wanted Appellant Johnson to join the gym, and who 
distracted her from reading, analyzing and understanding the release clause 
in the contract. The saleman did not explain the clause. Relev. Fact No. 20. 
Even the owner of the gym does not know if it releases liability for injuries 
in the parking lot. Relev. Fact No. 19. Also, the exculpatory clause is 
ambiguous, overbroad and against public policy. It should be narrowly 
construed. 
The court must look at the purpose of the clause so as to strictly 
construe it. For example, in Ghionis, supra, Deer Valley argued its "as is" 
clause in a contract precluded a claim for breach of implied warranty. But 
the court reviewed the document from a layman's perspective and found the 
purpose of the agreement was to get the user to care for the equipment while 
in his possession. It also found the "as is" was not conspicuous, in bold, or 
in italics, but just in plain text. Therefore, it refused to enforce the 
exculpatory clause. 
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In the instant case, the purpose of the contract was to allow Appellant 
Johnson to become a member of the gym. The release was to get patrons 
who use the gym equipment to inspect the machines before they use them. It 
was to tell the patron that he, as well as the trainer, should look at the 
equipment to see if it works before using it. The user, the member, has the 
last chance to adjust, observe and decide to use each piece of equipment. 
The gym maintains the equipment to keep its members happy. One would 
not interpret this release as including any injury suffered in the parking lot 
because of the gym's negligence. 
In Ghionis, the court also looked at the conspicuous language to 
decide whether to apply the release. Here, the conspicuous language, in 
capital letters in the release read, "ANY PERSON USING THE 
EQUIPMENT OR THE FACILITIES DOES SO AT THEIR OWN RISK." 
This language in no way related to the parking lot. But then Appellee Gym 
expanded the language in the release beyond the language in the 
conspicuous, capital letters. The plain text following the conspicuous words 
adds that the release also applies to "the premises where the same is 
located." Appellant Johnson maintains the meaning of "premises" is 
ambiguous. But if one assumes, as the trial court did, that "premises" 
means the parking lot, then this language relating to the premises is inserted 
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in a way the member will not appreciate that the release is going to apply to 
the premises, as well as to the equipment or facilities. This release for 
liability parking lot should not be allowed because the word "premises" was 
not included in the conspicuous language. 
An example of when an overbroad release in a fitness club's 
membership agreement was not enforced is in Atkins v. Swimwest Family 
Fitness Center, 691 NW.2d 334, 338, 340 (Wisc.2005). There, a mom 
drowned in a swimming pool. The Court of Appeals refused to enforce the 
exculpatory clause. The clause said, "I assume all liability for myself 
without regard to fault. I hold harmless the Fitness Center for any condition 
or injury to myself." Id. at 340. The court looked at the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the agreement to see if it was broad enough to 
cover the activity at issue. If not, it was unenforceable. It explained that 
public policy restricts freedom of contract for the good of the community. 
Id. at 339. The contract may be void if it does not alert the signer to what 
is being waived, and to the significance of what is waived. Id. The Gold's 
Gym release did not alert Appellant Johnson to the alleged fact that by 
signing the membership agreement she was releasing Appellee Gym from 
negligently failing to maintain the parking lot. The clause is overbroad and 
not enforceable. 
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An exculpatory clause is overbroad if it covers too many acts. For 
example, does the release purport to release intentional acts, reckless acts, 
and negligent acts? Any release of intentional and reckless acts are clearly a 
violation of public policy. R.2d Torts, Section 195(a)(ALI). When a release 
is overbroad, against public policy, it must be strictly construed against the 
party who wrote it. Swimwest, supra, 691 NW.2d at 341. Here, the release 
is overbroad because it is not limited to claims of negligence but it applies 
against claims of intentional and reckless torts. 
The trial court reasoned that even though the release did not 
"explicitly mention negligence on the part of Gold's Gym, the language is 
clearly broad enough to include those instances in which Gold's Gym may 
be negligent." Memo.Dec. at 5. But it also is so broad as to include 
intentional or reckless actions. It should not be enforced because it is too 
broad. 
In addition, public policy prohibits an exculpatory clause that tries to 
exempt one from a duty he owes to the public. R.2d Contracts, Sec. 195 
(ALI, 1979), reads: 
2. A term exempting a party from tort liability for 
harm negligently caused is unenforceable on grounds of 
public policy if 
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b) the term exempts one charged with a duty of public 
service from liability to one to whom the duty is owed for 
compensation for breach of that duty. 
Appellee Gym has a duty to make its parking lot safe. It owes this duty to 
the public that uses the other stores in the strip mall. It operates its own 
business by charging for public admission when members want to use its 
gym. Public policy dictates that Appellee Gym cannot exempt itself from 
liability in negligence against its patrons by requiring them to sign an 
exculpatory clause in their membership contract when it cannot exempt itself 
from this liability against the public. 
The trial court relies on Woodside Homes to justify its ruling to 
enforce the release in the membership agreement. Memo Dec. at 4-5. But it 
is clearly distinguishable from this action. There, the parties were 
sophisticated contractors, builders and developers. The exculpatory clause 
limited the liability for a temporary time period, during the construction, and 
it only limited claims arising from visiting the jobsite. The jobsite is 
admittedly a dangerous place during construction. The contract made the 
parties aware of the inherent risk in the construction site. It was like a 
warning, "hard hat area." The clause required insurance from the contractor 
to cover the temporary risk of danger. The contractor got paid for providing 
services and to buy insurance to cover his risks during the construction. 
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Therefore, the court allowed the shifting of responsibility. But Appellant 
Johnson is not sophisticated like builders. Her use of the parking lot should 
not entail a risk of engaging in a dangerous activity. She should not be on 
high alert just because she parked in Gold Gym's parking lot. The clause 
and contract did not alert her to the risk associated with the parking lot. 
The release clause should not be enforced when it releases a defendant 
from his own negligence. See Adloo v. Brown, 344 Md. 254, 686 A.2d 298, 
301 (Md.l996)(a realtor made its listed property owners sign a release but 
this did not release the realtor from its own negligence when it mistakenly 
gave the lock box combination to a thief who stole $40,000 in jewelry from 
a listed house.) Likewise, a duty to the general public cannot be released by 
an exculpatory clause because it violates public policy. Johnson v. Rapid 
City Softball Assn., 514 NW.2d 693 (SD 1994)(city exculpatory clause 
releasing it from all negligence in maintaining its public athletic fields was 
unenforceable on public policy grounds.) An innkeeper could not 
circumvent its duty to protect guests by an exculpatory clause because it had 
a duty to the public. Yang v. Voyagaire Houseboats, Inc., 701 NW.2d 783, 
789 (Minn.2005) (houseboat renter released company when leased boat, but 
exculpatory clause unenforceable where renter suffered carbon monoxide 
poisoning on vacation. 
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Clearly, the release is overbroad and against public policy. It is 
designed to release liability for the use of exercise equipment, which may be 
dangerous and the user should use caution before using it. But it cannot be 
applied to negligence claims arising out of the use of the parking lot. 
Lastly, with regard to the exculpatory clause in the contract, the trial 
court erred in finding that the word "premises" in the contract clearly and 
unequivocally refers to the parking lot. Memo. Dec. at 6. Premises does not 
clearly and unambiguously include a parking lot. The Websters 
Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary says one meaning, particularly in legal 
contracts, for instance in fire insurance, refers to buildings on land. Also, 
premises, in a rental agreement, describes the apartment being rented. Even 
the President of the gym does not know if the release applies to claims 
arising in negligence in the parking lot. Fact F, supra. The word "premises" 
is ambiguous because it has several possible meanings. The release clause is 
overbroad because it does not clearly and unequivocally apply to the parking 
lot. It should not be enforce against Appellant Johnson to preclude her 
action for her injuries suffered in the parking lot. 
II. Appellant Johnson's claim of injury from an unsafe condition on 
property does not arise from a temporary condition on property 
and she does not have to prove that Appellees had notice and a 
reasonable time to fix the unsafe condition as a precondition to 
Appellees5 liability. 
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The trial court indicated that in premises liability cases, Utah case law 
creates two classes of unsafe conditions: those that are temporary, and those 
that are of a permanent nature. Memo. Dec. at 7 of 11. The Court held as a 
matter of law that unsafe asphalt in a parking lot is a temporary condition. 
Memo. Dec. at 7-8 of 11. Then it found that defendants had never observed 
or been made aware of any dangerous condition , either cracks or holes, 
existing within the asphalt parking lot." Memo Dec. at 2, para. 7. And 
"Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that defendants had notice of any 
dangerous condition existing in the parking lot prior to plaintiffs fall." 
Memo. Dec. at 3, para. 11. The unsafe asphalt clearly occurred over time 
and is a result of lack of maintenance. But these facts do not mean that the 
unsafe condition is temporary in nature. The unsafe condition may have 
been there for years because of a long pattern of failure to maintain. 
When an unsafe condition on property is temporary, then fault cannot 
be imputed to the defendant so that liability results unless two conditions 
result: (a) that the defendant had knowledge or constructive notice of the 
condition; and (b) defendant had sufficient time to fix the unsafe condition 
after he knew about it, but did not fixit. Goebel v. Salt Lake City S.RR, 
2004 UT 80, 104P.3d 1185. 
When the unsafe condition is of a permanent nature a plaintiff does 
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not have to show that the defendant had notice of the unsafe condition. This 
later class is described as follows: 
[It] involes some unsafe condition of a permanent nature, 
such as: in the structure of the building, or of a stairway, etc. or 
in equipment or machinery or in the manner of use, which was 
created or chosen by the defendant (or his agents) or for which 
he is responsible. In such circumstances, where defendant 
either created the condition, or is responsible for it, he is 
deemed to know of the condition; and no further proof of notice 
is necessary. 
Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., 538 P.23d 175 (Utah 1975), QUOTED 
in Goebel, 104 P.2d at 1193. This case is one where Appellees are 
responsible for the condition and notice is not required for Appellant 
Johnson to go forward in her negligence action. Appellees are responsible 
for the condition because of their duty as possessors of land to business 
invitees, and Appellee Gym is has the duty to maintain the parking lot under 
the lease contract between Appellees. 
The R.2d Torts, Chap. 13, provides for liability for the condition and 
use of land. There is a difference in the duties imposed by Section 342 as 
compared with Section 343, Restatement 2d. The former only imposes a 
duty on the possessor of land when he knows of a dangerous condition and 
fails to cure it. The Court's analysis may apply to a cause of action under 
Section 342, where notice and a chance to cure are critical elements of the 
cause of action. 
The later section, Section 343, R.2d Torts, applies in this case. The 
possessor has a greater duty, an affirmative duty, to make the property 
reasonably safe for the use of its business invitees. The business holds the 
land open to the business invitee, it gives the implied assurance that the land 
is prepared, made ready and safe for the reception of the business invitee and 
his use. The relevant facts , nos. 2-18. supra, show a genuine fact issue of 
whether Appellees failed to make the parking lot safe for its business 
invitees. 
MUJI 11.3, states, "One who extends to a business visitor an 
invitation, ..., is obliged to refrain from acts of negligence and to exercise 
ordinary care to keep the premises in a condition reasonable safe for 
business visitors." See Glenn v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 265 P.2d 1013 
(1954). This jury instruction clearly follows Section 343, R.2d Torts. See 
also Stewart v. Reynolds, 84 SW.3d 569, 573 (Mo.App.2002)( affirmative 
duty to maintain improved parking lot); Harris v. Old Kent Bank, 735 NE.2d 
758, 764 (Ill.App.2000)(fact issue whether sidewalk defect is de minimis or 
unsafe). 
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Likewise, the lessor of the property, Appellee Peay, has a duty to 
exercise reasonable care to see that the leased property is safe for the use so 
intended, and that the condition of the parking lot will not expose the public 
to unreasonable risk of harm. MUJI 11.12. The Court did not address any 
basis for dismissing Appellee Peay from this cause of action. The 
deposition excerpts from Mr. Tregeagle, on behalf of this Appellee, clearly 
indicate that it did nothing to meet its affirmative duty to make sure the 
parking lot was safe. 
The trial court relies on Goebel in its ruling. But Goebel is clearly 
inapplicable in this situation. First, the plaintiff there was not a business 
invitee but just a member of the public. Second, The unsafe condition was 
not obvious and apparent. It was not discovered even after reasonable 
inspections and use. It was two field mats that abutted the railroad tracks. 
The plaintiffs expert and plaintiff had been there recently and not 
discovered that the mats were separated from the track. Also, the defendant 
showed he performed regular inspections. Id. at 194. Appellant Johnson is 
owed a higher duty than a member of the public because she is a business 
invitee. Appellees owe a duty to its business invitee to perform regular 
inspections of the parking lot to keep it safe. The inferences in favor of 
Appellant Johnson are that the defects in the parking lot were apparent and 
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obvious. There is a genuine issue of fact of whether the property is subject 
to the analysis of an unsafe condition of a permanent nature. Therefore, 
Goebel does not apply. 
The rationale in Goebel for finding the unsafe condition temporary in 
nature was that 
"a party has notice of conditions that the party itself creates, but 
it is not reasonable to presume notice of conditions that 
someone else creates (as in Schnuphase), that arise from 
malfunction (as in Fishbaugh), or that gradually evolve on their 
own. 
Id. at 1194. 
In Goebel, the rationale is right because the defendant was meeting its 
duty. Southern RR was doing regular inspections. The rationale is that a 
party may not know about the unsafe condition long enough to require them 
to fix it before some is hurt. But this rationale does not apply to Appellee 
Gym. It had a permanent duty to its business invitees to inspect, maintain 
and repair its parking lot. But the inference, when viewed in favor of 
Appellant Johnson, is that Appellee does not do regular inspection of the 
parking lot, it did not assign or train anyone to inspect, maintain or repair the 
parking lot. See Relevant Facts Nos. 2-18. Appellee Gym never repaired 
the parking lot for nine months after it knew about Appellant Johnson's 
injury. Relev. Fact Nos. 5,8. It was not meeting its duty as a business to 
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provide a safe place to its business invitees. The unsafe condition of the 
parking lot would not gradually evolve over time if Appellee Gym were 
performing required inspection and maintenance to keep the parking lot safe 
for its business invitees. 
Appellees have a duty to maintain their parking lot in good repair. 
They are responsible for the condition of the parking lot. This duty is owed 
to their business invitees. Their duty is permanent, not temporary. The 
unsafe condition should be evaluated under the same standard as an unsafe 
condition of a permanent nature. 
III. The trial court erred in finding there is no factual issue on 
whether the defendants had constructive notice of the unsafe 
condition of the parking lot. 
The trial court ruled that there is no evidence the Appellees had constructive 
notice of the unsafe condition of the parking lot. Memo.Dec. at 9-10 or 11. 
This issue of constructive notice is a fact question and must go to a jury and 
not be decided on summary judgment by the trial court. Pollari v. Salt Lake 
City, 111 Utah 25, 176 P.2d 111 (1947). 
Constructive notice of an unsafe condition is where "information or 
knowledge of a fact is imputed to a person by law 'because he could have 
discovered the fact by proper diligence, and his situation was such as to cast 
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upon him the duty of inquiring into it." In re Discipline of Sonnenreich, 
2004 UT 3, 86 P.3d 712, quoting Black's Law Dictionary 733 (6th ed. 1991); 
Matheson v. Marbec Investments, LLC, 173 P.3d 199 (Utah.App.2007). 
The defendant is imputed with this knowledge when "the defect would be 
apparent to ordinary prudent person with like experience, not to persons with 
specialized knowledge in the field of construction or real estate. Mitchell v. 
Christensen, 2001 UT 80, 31 P.13d 572. 
There is a significant fact issue of whether Appellee Gym had 
constructive notice of the defect. It never repaired the defective asphalt for 
over nine months after it clearly knew about it. Even four years later, it has 
only patched parts of the pavement, leaving clearly dangerous, defective 
asphalt unrepaired. See Declaration of Nelda Johnson, paras. 6-8. In 
addition, it is not telling the truth about the repairs so as to not disclose the 
identity of who did the repairs. Declaration of Nelda Johnson, para. 9-10. 
The maintenance engineer had no training about what to look for or what 
standard should be followed to repair asphalt. No one specifically evaluated 
the asphalt. Gold's Gym has not even provided the name of the entity who 
patched the asphalt in 2003-04, after the McDonald's building was removed 
and an entire section of parking lot was installed. This information is critical 
to see what the condition of the parking lot was in at that time. 
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The fact issue exists, contrary to the trial court's ruling, of whether 
the conduct of Appellee Gym means it failed to perform proper inspections, 
failed to inquire into the condition of the parking lot, so it is deemed to have 
notice of knowledge of the unsafe condition of the parking lot. This factual 
conclusion is a reasonable inference that a jury may make from the facts 
presented by Appellant Johnson and it should preclude summary judgment. 
This duty to inspect the property is mandated by R. 2d Torts, Section 
343, which reads: 
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm 
caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if 
he 
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would 
discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an 
unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and 
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the 
danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and 
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them 
against the danger. 
Constructive notice is the legal consequence imposed on a business when 
it has failed to exercise reasonable care to discover the unsafe condition on 
its property. 
Gold's Gym never had any policy for inspection of the parking lot. It 
failed to repair the defective asphalt for over nine months after it clearly 
knew about it. Even four years later, it had only patched parts of the 
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pavement, leaving clearly dangerous, defective asphalt unrepaired. See 
Addendum, Declaration of Nelda Johnson, paras. 6-8. 
In addition, Gold's Gym is lying about the repairs so as to not disclose 
the identity of who did the repairs. See Addendum, Declaration of Nelda 
Johnson, para. 9-10 
Furthermore, the deposition testimony supports the inference that Gold's 
Gym knew or should have known about the dangerous condition in the 
asphalt and failed to cure it over a long period of time. Relev. Fact Nos. 2-
14. 
The maintenance engineer had no training on what to look for or what 
standard should be followed to repair asphalt. No one specifically evaluated 
the asphalt. Id., no. 8. the President of Appellee Gym did not know it had a 
duty to maintain the parking lot. Relev. Fact No. 9. 
These facts clearly support the fact issue of whether Gold's Gym failed to 
conduct reasonable inspections of the parking lot, that the defect was left in 
the parking lot when the defendant knew or should of known of its 
existence, and that the defendant failed to timely cure the defect. The fact 
issue exists contrary to the trial court's ruling. 
IV. The trial court was the improper venue to 
decide the motion for summary judgment. 
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This matter was in front of the judge that entered summary judgment in 
this matter for only four months. Defendant filed for summary judgment on 
April 6, 2007. Then the court transferred this action from Provo to 
American Fork on May 16, 2007, and a new judge was assigned. The new 
trial judge issued a memorandum decision granting summary judgment on 
September 17,2007. 
This legal issue is subject to de novo review, without reference to the trial 
court decision. Plaintiff has a right to file her cause of action in the most 
convenient forum. She had to choose where venue was proper. She lives 
one mile from the Orem courthouse, and just 4 miles from the Provo 
courthouse. The American Fork Courthouse is probably 20 miles away. 
Plaintiff had to file her lawsuit in Provo and she wanted it there because it is 
the most convenient forum for her and her witnesses, and the defendant's 
premises where she was injured is there. Gold's Gym is probably just one 
mile from the Provo courthouse. 
This matter was transferred to American Fork on, or about May 15, 2007, 
two years after it had proceeded in Provo, without any notice, request for 
consent, or motion. This matter should be remanded for proceedings In 
Provo. Once a complaint is filed, the law prescribes when it may be moved 
elsewhere. Section 78-13-9 states: 
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The court may, on motion, change the place of trial in the 
following cases: 
(2) when there is reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot 
be had in the county, city or precinct designated in the 
complaint; 
(3) when the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice 
would be promoted by the change. 
(4) when all the parties to an action, by stipulation or by 
consent in open court entered in the minutes, agree that the 
place of trial may be changed to another county. Thereupon, 
the court must order the change as agreed upon. 
A motion for change of venue is timely if made before trial. Anderson v. 
Mammoth Mining Co., 26 Utah 357, 73 P. f412 (1903). 
Then, Section 78-13-10 states: 
If any action or proceeding is commenced or is pending in a 
court and the court orders the place of trial to be changed, it 
must be transferred for trial to a court the parties may agree 
upon by stipulation in writing or made in open court and 
entered in the minutes, or if they do not so agree, then to the 
nearest court where like objection or cause of making the order 
does not exist. 
These provisions of the law were violated by transferring this action to 
American Fork. This matter was moved without any allegation of an 
impartial trial in Provo, without considering the convenience of the 
witnesses or parties, and without any stipulation of consent of the parties 
change the place where the trial will take place. The law specifically 
requires that when an action is pending, the parties have an opportunity to 
give input before the place of trial is changed. In this case, the case was 
moved when the parties were in the middle of disputes over discovery, 
summary judgment and motions to compel. The exigent nature of the 
proceedings precluded Plaintiff from considering what rights she may have 
had with regard to where the trial would take place. 
Likewise, when a cause of action is commenced, the parties may try to 
remove an assigned judge. Rules 63, 63 A, Ut.Civ.Proc. But these rights are 
obscured and restricted when a case is reassigned to another city in the 
middle of hotly contested issues being litigated. This matter should be 
remanded to the Provo Courthouse for trial. 
V. The trial court abused its discretion in striking Appellant 
Johnson's experts witnesses. 
The trial court abused its discretion in striking and excluding 
Appellant Johnson's expert witnesses who would testify about the duty to 
maintain the parking lot, and the extent of the unsafe condition of the 
parking lot. Appellee Gym filed for summary judgment on April 4, 2007. 
Appellant Johnson, on April 24, 2007, requested more time be able to 
respond to summary judgment. She explained how Appellee Peay had failed 
to serve discovery answers. This Appellee is represented by the same 
attorney who filed for summary judgment. Five weeks after answers were 
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due counsel for Appellee Peay served objections, but no real answers. The 
absence of this factual information precluded Plaintiff from getting reports 
from her experts. 
Appellee Peay should have lost the privilege of objecting to the 
discovery when he failed to timely respond. Rule 33(b), URCP, provides 30 
days to answer or object to the interrogatories. Then it adds, "All grounds 
for an objection to an interrogatory shall be stated with specificity. Any 
ground not stated in a timely objection is waived unless the party's failure to 
object is excused by the court for good cause shown." Id. at 33(b)(4). When 
no timely objection was raised, it was waived. 
Then, the same defendant failed and refused to appear for a 
deposition. These delays clearly prejudiced Appellant Johnson in her 
attempt to identify expert witnesses and prepare their reports. Just for 
example, Relevant Fact Nos. 10 and 13 show that an experienced contractor 
performed work on or near the property in 2003 or 2004. This fact was only 
discovered in May 2007, when Appellee Peay finally submitted to a 
deposition. But this was six weeks after the motion for summary judgment 
was filed. That contractor who did the work was never identified. Appellant 
Johnson followed up on the little information she had and found the aerial 
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overflights showed the extensive work on the pavement. This information 
had never been provided. 
It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to strike Appellant 
Johnson's experts on July 3, 2007, and to deny her the opportunity to show 
the likely defects in the pavement at the time of her injury. 
VL The trial court was without jurisdiction to enter an order on the 
motion to reconsider or on defendant's motion to strike Plaintiffs 
photographs and erroneously seeks to impose a rule barring any 
pre-final-judgment motions to reconsider. 
The trial court ruled that "when a trial court issues a decision which 
disposes of all claims in a matter a party is precluded from revisting the case 
by way of a "motion to reconsider." Ruling, p. 3. The trial court 
acknowledges that this rule applies to post-fmal-judgments under Gillett v. 
Price, 2006 UT 24, but applies this rule to its "pre-final-judgment rulings. 
Ruling, p. 7. 
This legal issue is one of de novo review, without deference to the 
trial court. 
The trial court was obviously perturbed by Plaintiffs Motion for 
Reconsideration of the Order Granting Summary Judgment. The trial court 
opined that Plaintiff was just "re-arguing her case," supplementing the 
record, or presenting new evidence after discovery was completed, and after 
the court had worked hard on a memorandum decision. 
Ruling on Motions to Reconsider, Strike and Compel, pages 7-8, filed Nov. 
29, 2007. 
In this spirit of resentment of having to evaluate the evidence against 
summary judgment, the trial court argues for an extension of the rule in 
Gillett, cutting off motions to reconsider on "pre-final-judgment rulings." 
Id. p. 7. The court exclaimed "As shown here, there exists no reason to limit 
this analysis to post final judgment scenarios." 
Unfortunately, the trial court fails to grasp the importance of a fair 
litigation process for Plaintiff. The memorandum in support of the motion to 
reconsider clearly states the reasons for the motion. They included pointing 
out "clear legal error" and factual error in the court's finding that there was 
no fact issue of constructive notice. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of 
Motoin for Reconsideration of Order Granting Summary Judgment, page 1, 
filed October 10,2007. 
The trial court wanted to get rid of this case on summary judgment. It 
denied plaintiff an opportunity to present her evidence or be heard at trial. It 
struck her expert witnesses when she had been hindered by defendants 
failure to answer discovery. Plaintiff hoped to correct the trial court from its 
errors so as to avoid an appeal in this matter, avoid delay of another year 
before she could present her case, and help the trial court avoid the 
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embarrassment of being reversed on appeal. In addition, Plaintiffs effort to 
make sure the trial court clearly understood the factors in favor of Plaintiff s 
opposition to summary judgment sharpened, focused and clarified the 
arguments for appeal. These reasons in favor of pre-final judgment motions 
to reconsider should not be stifled by a rule that bars such motions. 
On the other hand, defendant filed a motion to strike photographs after 
the judgment was entered on October 18, 2007, as contrasted with the pre-
final judgment motion filed by plaintiff. Defendant's motion is 
inappropriate under Gillett. Defendant's motion to strike photographs 
clearly came after a final judgment was entered. It was filed about 
November 14, 2007. There is no basis for the motion. But the trial court 
granted it, even after reciting how this type of motion was barred by Gillett. 
That ruling is clear legal error. 
Furthermore, the trial court had no jurisdiction to issue a ruling on the 
motion to reconsider 42 days after the final judgment was filed, and 13 days 
after a notice of appeal was filed. The trial court's ruling should be 
disregarded. It lost jurisdiction when the Notice of appeal was filed. 
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CONCLUSION and RELIEF SOUGHT 
IN CONCLUSION, Plaintiffs cause of action should not be 
precluded by the exculpatory clause in the contract. The clause is 
unenforceable because it is ambiguous in restricting the rights of injured 
patrons on its premises. Premises could mean either within the gym, or 
outside, including the parking lot. The ambiguity must be construed in favor 
of Appellant Johnson. The clause is overbroad in that it bars actions arising 
from intentional or reckless conduct. And it waives a duty that Gold's Gym 
owes in providing the public where its business is one charging for public 
admission, and its clients, a safe place, safe access and safe egress. 
Furthermore, genuine fact issues exist as to whether Appellees had 
constructive notice of the dangerous condition of the asphalt and failed to 
make it safe for its business invitees. Also, the defect of the condition of the 
asphalt on private property in a parking lot of a business that charges for 
public admission should be evaluated as a permanent condition of property, 
and not as a temporary condition that requires notice and time to fix the 
condition before the business may be held liable to its business invitees. 
In addition, Appellant Johnson should be allowed to complete fact 
discovery, then disclose the expert witness reports, so she could use them in 
opposition to summary judgment and at trial. 
48 
Finally, this matter should be sent to the Provo Court. And Appellant 
Johnson should be awarded costs for this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted on this / day of June, 2008. 
/° /? -
S. Austin Johnson 
Counsel for Appellant Johnson 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, counsel of record, hereby certify I sent a copy of this Brief of 
Appellant to opposing counsel by email, pursuant to agreement with same 
counsel, on this ^ d a y of June, 2008.. 
S. Austin Johnson 
Counsel for Appellant Johnson 
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